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1A bstract
That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even
when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the
experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse
o® than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic mo-
tivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using
recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution-
ary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number
of contributors to be selected in the long run. JournalofEconom i c
Li t er at ur e C l a s s i ¯ c a t i o nN u m b e r s :C 7 2 ,D 2 3 ,H 4 1 ,M 1 4 ,Z 1 3 . K e y -
words: work ethic, evolution, group selection, public goods, stochastic
dynamics.
2O rganizations endure [...] in proportion to the breadth of the m orality by
w hich they are governed.
C hester I. B arnard, T he Functions of the E xecutive,1938.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In a social dilem m a the provision of a public good requires som e costly ef-
fo rt fro m o n e o r m o re in d iv id u a ls, b u t ex p licit co n tra ctin g is n o t p o ssib le.
Ea c hp a r t i c i p a n ti nad i l e mmat h e r e f o r eh a sa ni n c e n t i v et of r e e - r i d eo nt h e
contributions of the others. H ow socialinstitutions m itigate socialdilem m as
is the subject ofa large literature both in econom ics and the socialsciences
m ore generally. In this paper, w e instead study the evolutionary survival
properties of an intrinsic m otivation to contribute in dilem m a situations.
C onsider the case ofcooperation w ithin the ¯rm . W hen individualcontri-
buti onsto outputarenotveri ¯abl y m easurabl e,com pl etecontracti ng wi thi n
the ¯rm is im possible, and a free-rider problem is present. T his observation
has been used as the basi s for expl anati ons of the organi zati onalstructure
of the ¯rm , such as the m onitoring and budget-balance-breaking roles of
an outside ow ner discussed by A lchian and D em setz [1] and H olm strÄ om [ 7] ,
respectively.
B ut free-rider problem s in production m ay also be overcom e if individ-
ual agents have an internalized w ork ethic. E xperim ental evidence of long
standing suggests that
1. peopl e do in fa ct co n trib u te in d ilem m a situ a tio n s ev en th o u g h co n tri-
bution is not enforceable,and
2. the rate of contri buti on i s decl i ni ng i n group si ze and the i ndi vi dual
cost of contributing.
(See, e.g., the classic study of Latan¶ e, W illia m s, a n d H a rk in s [1 0 ]. F o r a
survey speci¯cally ofthe experim ents on the underlying m odelofthe present
3paper, see C roson and M arks [6].) In a broad sense, laboratory behav-
ior therefore m ore or less conform s to som e of the possible predictions of
the noncooperati ve publ i c goodsprovi si on m odeli ntroduced by Pal f rey and
Rosenthal[ 13,14] ,whi ch we shal ltake asourbasi c m odeli n thi spaper.
A versi on of thi s m odelwas ori gi nal l y proposed to expl ai n phenom ena
such as posi ti ve turnout i n el ecti ons. G i ven that other peopl e vote, the
p ro b a b ility o f b ein g p iv o ta l is sm a ll. If v o tin g is co stly to th e in d iv id u a l
voter, how can it be rational to vote? T he earlier political science literature
puzzled over this. It w as often suggested that observed voting behavior could
only be explained by there being utility directly attached to the act ofvoting.
T hi s noti on i s probl em ati c for at l east two reasons. Fi rst,i t cannot be
ra tio n a l fo r ev ery o n e to a b sta in , eith er, sin ce th en th e p ro b a b ility o f b ein g
deci si ve i s one for an i ndi vi dualw ho does deci de to vote. H ence there m ust
b e so m e p o sitiv e tu rn o u t in eq u ilib riu m . T h is is th e p o in t m a d e b y P a lfrey
a n d R o sen th a l. B u t seco n d ly, ev en if in d iv id u a ls a re in trin sica lly m o tiva ted
to vote, or, m ore generally, to contribute tow ard the provision of a public
g o o d , h ow co u ld su ch a b eh av io ra l tra it su rv iv e in th e lo n g ru n if it is co stly
to its carrier?
Since in any given dilem m a interaction a contributor is alw ays strictly
w orse o® than a non-contributor, the intrinsic m otivation to contribute|
w hat we shal lthi nk ofas a wor ke t hi c | coul d not evol ve unl ess there were
ma n yi n t e r a c t i o n sg o i n go na tt h es a met i me ,a n db e h a v i o r a lma t e r i a lf r o m
one i nteracti on m i ght end up i n another l ater on. Ifthe l atter i s the case,
then the direct ¯tness disadvantage of contributors m ay be balanced by the
indirect cost to noncontributors arising from the risk of being m atched into
an interaction w here there are too few contributors and w here the public
good i s therefore not provi ded. W hen thi s happens, we are deal i ng w i th
g ro u p selectio n in th e sen se o f, e.g ., S o b er a n d W ilso n [1 9 ].
T h e g en era l P a lfrey -R o sen th a l m o d el ty p ica lly h a s m u ltip le eq u ilib ria ,
som e of w hich involve positive contributions, others w hich do not. In this
paper we em bed the gam e i n a dynam i c evol uti onary setti ng wi th random
4m utati ons (al ong the l i nes ofYoung and Foster [ 23]and K andori ,M ai l ath,
a n d R o b [8 ]), w h ich a llow s u s to p red ict th e eq u ilib ria w e w o u ld b e lik ely
to observe i n the l ong run. By evol uti on we shal lm ean cul turalevol uti on
by m eans ofi m i tati on ofsuccessfulbehavi or,but our m odeli s al so open to
otheri nterpretati ons.W eshow thatf orgroup si zessm al lenough,and a cost
ofcontri buti ng l ow enough,i n the l ong run we are m ostl i kel y to observe a
positive am ount of contributions even w hen also non-contribution is a stable
state of the determ inistic m odel.
Thepa pe ri so r g a ni z e da sf o l l o ws .W ei n t r o duc et heunde r l y i ngmo de lb y
m eans of a sim ple exam ple,and note the relation to group selection theories,
i n Secti on 2. Secti on 3 studi es the determ i ni sti c evol uti onary dynam i cs of
the m ore general m odel. W e note that there are generally evolutionarily
stabl e equi l i bri a i nvol vi ng no contri buti on. Secti on 4 gi ves exam pl es of al l
the possible dynam ic behaviors of the determ inistic m odel. In Section 5
w e in tro d u ce m u ta tio n s, a n d g iv e co n d itio n s fo r eq u ilib ria w ith a p o sitiv e
m easure of contributors to be selected in the long run. Section 6 concludes.
A ll proofs of propositions are in the A ppendix.
2 G roup Sel ecti on and the W ork Ethi c
W hen contributors survive evolutionary selection in socialdilem m a interac-
ti ons,as we shal lshow m ay happen,i t i s an exam pl e ofgroup sel ection at
w ork. G roup selection is naturalselection w here w hat m atters is the di®eren-
ti al¯tnessesofgroups,notdi ®erencesi n ¯tnessbetween i ndi vi dual swi thi n
the sam e group. O f special interest are situations in w hich a trait that is
di sadvantaged vis-µ a-vi s other traits w ithin a group can nevertheless grow in
relative population representation over tim e.
Al ready Charl esD arwi n noted thatthesurvi valoftrai tsseem i ngl y di sad-
vantageousto the i ndi vi dualorgani sm m i ghtbe expl ai ned by thei rbene¯ts
f orthe group.The centralprobl em thatgroup sel ecti on theori eshave f aced
5In d ivid u al 2
Wo r k e r S h i r k e r
In d ivid u al 1 Wo r k e r 1 ¡ k;1 ¡ k 1 ¡ k;1
Shi rker 1;1 ¡ k 0;0
Tabl e 1: A n exam pl e group i nteracti on.
si nce then i s to de¯ne preci sel y what consti tutes a group. O nl y f ai rl y re-
cen tly, th a n k s to th e w o rk o f, e.g ., S o b er a n d W ilso n [1 9 ], h a s so m e cla rity
b e e nr e a c h e do nt h i si s s u e .
A lthough group selection e®ectshave recently attracted som e attention in
econom i cs(see,e. g. ,SjÄ ostrÄ om and W ei tzm an [ 18] ,B ergstrom [ 5] ,R obson [ 15] ,
and K uzm ics [9]),it is seldom pointed out that the potentialfor such e®ects
i s al ready bui l t i nto the standard evol uti onary gam e theory m odel .
C onsider the follow ing exam ple,a specialcase ofthe m ore generalm odel
(due to P alfrey and R osenthal [13]) that w e shall study in this paper. A
group consi stsoftwo i ndi vi dual s. A n i ndi vi duali sprogram m ed1 to be either
a wor ke rora shirker.Iftherei satl eastoneworkeri n thegroup,thegroup i s
successf ul ,and each i ndi vi dualgetsa grosspayo®,or¯t ness,of1.O therwi se
each i ndi vi dualgets a payo® ofzero. A worker al so al ways sustai ns the cost
k,wi t h 0<k <1. T hat i s,the payo® structure ofthe group i nteracti on i s
as show n i n Tabl e 1.
N ote that if there is one w orker and one shirker in the group, the ¯tness
of the w orker is strictly less than that of the shirker. H ence w e m ay say that
w orkers are strictly disadvantaged relative to shirkers in a group. (N ote that
this does not m ean that being a w orker is a strictly dom inated strategy.) B ut
if the group consists of tw o shirkers, they w ill both do less w ell than does a
1A related paper, Lohmann, Oechssler, and WÄ arneryd [11], studies the survival proper-
ties of altruistic preferences in a social dilemma where individuals behave rationally given
their preferences and their information about the interaction situation.
6w orker in a group w ith a shirker. A group w ith tw o shirkers is not successful.
That i s,al though a worker al ways has l ower ¯tness than a shi rker in th e
sam e group,i n a group w i th at l east one worker everyone has greater ¯tness
than i ndi vi dual si n a group w i th onl y shi rkers.H ence workersi ncrease group
¯tnessatthe expense ofthei rown i ndi vi dual¯tness.
Suppose now that there are m any groups,com posed random l y out ofa
large population w here the overallshare of w orkers is x 2 [0 ;1] . T he average
¯t nes sofwor ker si st hen1¡ k,and thatofshi rkersi sx¢1+ (1¡ x)¢0= x. H ence
if w e h av e x< 1 ¡ k,workers have greater average ¯tness than shi rkers and
wo u l dt e n dt og r o wi nr e l a t i v er e p r e s e n t a t i o ni nt h ep o p u l a t i o n .Co n v e r s e l y ,
if a t a n y tim e w e h av e x> 1 ¡ k,the population proportion ofshirkers w ould
increase. H ence x =1 ¡ k is the only stable proportion of w orkers. A lthough
w orkers su®er the cost k, s h i r k e r sr u nt h er i s ko f e n d i n gu pi nag r o u pt h a t
i snotsuccessf ul .
S o b er a n d W ilso n [1 9 ] id en tify tw o p ro p erties n ecessa ry fo r g ro u p selectio n
ofl ocal l y di sadvantaged trai tsto occur| thatgroup i nteracti onsare i sol ated
f rom each other i n payo® term s,i . e. ,that what happens i n one group does
not a®ect what happens i n another,and that there i s m i xi ng ofbehavi oral
m ateri alover ti m e,so that the o®spri ng ofpl ayers i n one group m ay end up
i n another,di ®erentl y com posed,group. Thi s al so hi ghl i ghts the f act that
evolutionary gam e theory in general (see, e.g., M ailath [12] for a survey) is,
i n essence,about group sel ecti on. T he standard evol uti onary gam e theory
m odelconcernsi ndi vi dualagentsf rom a l argepopul ati on random l y m atched
a n d re-m a tch ed to p lay g a m es (ty p ica lly, tw o -p lay er g a m es). T h e m a tch is,
ofcourse,a group.
Aswehaveseen,thel arge- popul ati on versi on ofourexam pl egam ehasa
u n iq u e sta b le ev o lu tio n a ry eq u ilib riu m w ith a p o sitiv e freq u en cy o f w o rk ers.
In the fol l ow i ng we shal l show , however, that i n a m ore general setti ng,
w ith m ore than tw o players in a group and a contribution threshold greater
th a n o n e, th ere is a lw ay s a sta b le eq u ilib riu m w ith n o w o rk ers a s w ell. W e
shal leventual l y gi ve condi ti onsforan equi l i bri um w i th posi ti ve contri buti on
7levels to be selected in the long run w hen the system is sub jected to random
m utations.
3 D eterm i ni sti c E vol uti on
W enow general i zetheexam pl ef rom theprecedi ng secti on.W eassum ethere
i s a l arge num ber N ofi ndi vi dual s,each ofwhom i s ei ther a w orker or a
shirker. T he share of w orkers in the population is x 2 [0 ;1] .
Individuals are random ly m atched 2 in to ¯rm s that have n ¸ 2me mb e r s
each. E ach ¯rm 's technology is such that in case there are at least m wor ke r s
i n the¯rm ,the¯rm i ssuccessf uland each ¯rm m em bergetsa grosspayo® or
¯tness of 1. W e assum e 1 · m · n . A s before,w orkers also alw ays sustain
the ¯tness cost k,wi t h 0<k <1.
L etting ¹ be the random num ber ofother workers i n a m atchi ng,the
expected ¯tnessofa workeri stheref ore
u w (x): = Pr ob( ¹ ¸ m ¡ 1)¢1+ Pr o b( ¹<m ¡ 1)¢0 ¡ k;
and that ofa shi rker
u s(x): = Pr ob( ¹ ¸ m ) ¢1+ Pr o b( ¹<m) ¢0:
Hence the average expected ¯tnessi n the popul ati on i s
¹ u(x): = xuw +( 1 ¡ x)u s = x(P rob(¹ ¸ m ¡ 1)¡ k)+ ( 1¡ x)P rob(¹ ¸ m );
and the di®erence betw een the expected ¯tness of a w orker and the popula-
tion average is
u w (x) ¡ ¹ u(x)= ( 1¡ x)(P rob(¹ = m ¡ 1)¡ k):
2In the following, we shall ignore complications arising from the fact that the population
is actually ¯nite, i.e., we shall assume the law of large numbers applies.
8Si nce ¹ i sbi nom i al l y di stri buted we have that






m ¡1 (1 ¡ x)
n ¡m :
N ow assum e actions are taken at discrete tim es t 2f 1=N ;2=N ;:::g.I n
every peri od exactl y one i ndi vi dual ,draw n at random ,has the opportuni ty
to revise his strategy.
W e shal lassum e the strategy updati ng proceeds by m eans ofi m i tati on.
T he individualw ho gets the opportunity to revise observes the action choice
and current expected payo® of a random ly draw n other individual, and m ay
choose to i m i tate the behavi orofthe observed i ndi vi dual .
It seem s rea so n a b le to a ssu m e th a t th e p ro b a b ility o f im ita tio n is in crea s-
i ng i n the currentpayo® advantage ofthe sam pl ed acti on. In a non-strategi c
setti ng,Schl ag [ 16,17]show s that thi s i s i n fact the optim alschem e for im -
i tati on. Apestegui a,Huck,and O echssl er [ 2]provi de experi m entalresul ts
that suggest thi s m odelal so agrees wel lw i th actualbehavi or.
W e sh a ll h ere a ssu m e th e p ro b a b ility o f im ita tio n is in fa ct ex a ctly eq u a l
to the approxim ate expected payo® di®erence betw een the strategy of the
random l y drawn other pl ayer and that ofthe revi si ng i ndi vi dual ,provi ded
th is d i® eren ce is p o sitiv e. T h is b eh av io r d e¯ n es a M a rk ov ch a in X N on the
space ¢ N X = f0;1=N ;2=N ;:::;1g w ith the transition probabilities
P (x;x +1 =N )= x (1 ¡ x)m axfg(x) ¡ k;0g ;
P (x;x ¡ 1=N )= x (1 ¡ x)m axfk ¡ g(x);0g ;
and




T h e d i® eren ce b etw een th e ¯ rst tw o tra n sitio n p ro b a b ilities g iv es th e ex -
pected net i ncrease i n the popul ati on ofworkers from one transi ti on ti m e to
the next, conditional upon the current state x,as
F W (x)= P (x;x +1 =N ) ¡ P (x;x ¡ 1=N )= x (1 ¡ x)(g(x) ¡ k):
9N ote that this function is bounded and continuous in x. W e are interested in
the determ i ni sti c approxi m ati on ofthe above M arkov chai n when the popu-
lation size is large and thus the tim e interval betw een successive transition
tim es is short. T he associated m ean-¯eld equation
_ x = ' (x): = x (1 ¡ x)(g(x) ¡ k)
g iv ess th e lim itin g d eterm in istic d y n a m ic a s N tendsto i n¯ni ty.BenaÄ ³m a n d
W ei bul l[ 4]prove that f or l arge popul ati on si ze,the determ i ni sti c dynam i c
is a good approxim ation of the unperturbed M arkov chain. In particular,
b y P ro p o sitio n 4 o f B en aÄ³m a n d W eib u ll [4 ], a s N tends to i n¯ni ty, the
asym ptoti cf requencydi stri buti on ofX N w ill a lm o st su rely p u t a ll p ro b a b ility
m ass on the set of stationary states of the determ inistic dynam ic.
Thef unc t i o n' is also the determ inistic repl icator dynam ics ofevol uti on-
ary gam e theory,since it says that the grow th rate of w orkers is equalto the
di®erence betw een their current average ¯tness and the population average.
(SeeTayl orand Jonker[ 20] . ) T heori gi nalpurposeoftherepl i catordynam i cs
w as to serve as a m odelof asexualgenetic reproduction. W e have just seen
that it m ay also be interpreted in term s of im itation behavior.
A restpoint ofthi sdynam i csi sa poi ntx such that ' (x)= 0. A restpoi nt
x is in terior if 0 <x <1.











T he follow ing result about restpoints and all other results in the text are
proved i n the Appendi x.
P roposi ti on 1 U nder the repl icator dynam ics,x =0and x =1 are al ways
restpo in ts. In a dd itio n ,
1. i fm =1 ,t hen x =1 ¡ k 1=(n ¡1) is a restpoin t,
2. i fm = n ,t he n k 1=(n ¡1) is a restpo in t,
103. i f1 <m<nand k = k ma x,t he n x =( m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1) is a restpo in t,
and
4. i f 1 <m<nand k< k ma x, then there are two interior restpoints,
on e strictly less than (m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1), the other strictly greater than
(m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1).
There are no other restpoints.
T he interior restpoints correspond to the sym m etric m ixed strategy equi-
libria identi¯ed by P alfrey and R osenthal[13],w ho studied the static version
ofthi s m odel .
Ar e s t p o i n t i s asym ptoticall y stabl e| henceforth,stable| i f,l oosel y speak-
ing, a sm all perturbation causes the system eventually to return to the rest-
point. In the present context a restpoint is stable if the derivative of ' (x)
w ith respect to x i s negati ve at the restpoi nt. W e can show the f ol l owi ng
a b o u t th e sta b ility o f restp o in ts.
P roposi ti on 2 U nder the repl icator dynam i cs,
1. i f m =1 ,t h e n x =0 and x =1 a r eu n s t a b l er e s t p o i n t s ,a n dx =
1 ¡ k 1=(n ¡1) is a stable restpoin t,
2. i fm = n ,t he n x =0 and x =1 a r es t a b l er e s t p o i n t s ,a n dx = k 1=(n ¡1)
is an unstable restpoint, and
3. i f 1 <m<n ,t h e n x =0 is a stabl e restpoint, x =1 is a n u n stable
restpoint, and furtherm ore
(a) if k = k ma x,t h e n x =( m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1) i s an unstabl e restpoi nt,
and
(b) if k< k ma x, the lesser of the tw o in terior restpoin ts is u n stable
and the greater is stable.
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Fi gure 1: n =5 ;m =1 ;k = :25.
Wen o t ei np a r t i c u l a rt h a ta sl o n ga sweh a v em>1 ,t h e r ei sa l wa y sa
stable restpoint w ith no w orkers. W hen there is also a stable restpoint w ith a
positive m easure ofw orkers,as is the case except w hen m<n and k ¸ k ma x,
w e need to consider perturbations of the system in order to m ake sharper
p red ictio n s a b o u t th e u ltim a te o u tco m e.
4E x a m p l e s
In this section w e discuss som e exam ples that illustrate all the possible dy-
n a mi cb e h a v i o r so ft h ed e t e r mi n i s t i cmo d e l .
Throughout,we shal lset n = 5. In the phase di agram ofFi gure 1,we
havem =1 a n d k = :25. T here is therefore a unique stable interior restpoint
at x ¼ :29.
N ote that this restpoint is ine± cient. In general,the expected num ber of
workersi n a ¯rm when thepopul ati on sharei sx is eq u a l to nx. H ence in the
present case i t i s approxi m atel y 1:45. It woul d be e± ci ent to have exactl y
one participant w orking, but w e have assum ed that such a contract is not
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Fi gure 2: n =5 ;m =5 ;k = :25.
possible.
F igure 2 show s the situation w hen all participants in the ¯rm have to
be w orkers in order for the ¯rm to be successful, still w ith k = :25. In thi s
case,there is an unstable interior restpoint at x ¼ :71. Starting points below
:71 therefore ul ti m atel y converge to x = 0, starting points above to x =1 .
T he unstable interior restpoint m easure of w orkers is thus the criticalm ass
necessary for convergence to a population w here everyone is a w orker. W e
note that the latter situation is the unique e± cient one.
T he dynam i calsystem i n Fi gure 3 has an unstabl e restpoi nt at x ¼ :08
and a stabl e one at:5. In this case,the low er interior restpoint functions as a
critical m ass for convergence to the higher one. For future reference, denote
the lesser interior restpoint w hen there are tw o interior restpoints by x L ,and
the greater interior restpoint by x H . A gai n,the stabl e i nteri or restpoi nt x H
is ine± cient,since the expected num ber ofw orkers in a ¯rm is here 2:5 > 2.
Fi gure 4 show s an exam pl e w here we sti l lhave m =2 , b u t n o ww e h a v e
k = :5 >k ma x ¼ :42. H ence there are no interior restpoints, and the only
stable state is x =0 .
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Fi gure 3: n =5 ;m =2 ;k = :25.
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Fi gur e4:n =5 ;m =2 ;k = :5.
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Fi gure 5: n =5 ;m =3 ;k = :15.
If w e have n odd and m =( n +1 ) =2,' is sym m etric around a m axim um
at :5. Since w ith this param eter relationship a ¯rm is successful if m ore
than hal fofi tsm em bersare workers,we m i ghtcal lsuch technol ogi essim ple-
ma j o r i t ytech n o lo g ies. F ig u re 5 sh ow s a n ex a m p le w ith n =5 , m =3 , a n d
k = :15.
Wh e n w e h a v e k< k ma x,si m pl e-m ajori ty technol ogi esal l ow foranal yti cal



































In the exam ple, w e have x L ¼ :20 and x H ¼ :80.
155 Long-R un D ynam i cs
B i ol ogi calevol uti on i s subject to m utati ons,and i n the context ofcul tural
ev o lu tio n b y m ea n s o f im ita tio n o f su ccessfu l b eh av io r it m a k es sen se to
assum e that i ndi vi dual s m ay m ake m i stakes i n sel ecti ng thei r acti ons. Par-
ti cul arl y when studyi ng the behavi orofan evol uti onary system i n the very
long run it seem s reasonable to take into account that there m ay be persis-
tentrandom shocks. (See,e. g. ,Young and Foster[ 23] ,K andori ,M al ai th and
R o b [8 ], Y o u n g [2 1 ], o r Y o u n g [2 2 ].) T h is a lso tu rn s o u t to a llow u s m a k e
m ore precise predictions about situations w here the determ inistic replicator
dynam i cshasm ul ti pl e stabl e restpoi nts.
H ence w e now introduce perturbations to the M arkov chain de¯ned above.
Speci¯cally, w e assum e that w ith probability " 2 (0;1), the agent draw n to
revise his strategy picks a strategy at random ,irrespective ofthe payo® to the
current strategy. T his de¯nes a perturbed Ma r k o vc h a i nX N; "w ith transition
probabi l i ti es
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T he perturbations m ake the M arkov chain both irred u cible and aperiodic.3
Mo r e o v e r , a s" ten d s to zero , its tra n sitio n p ro b a b ilities co n v erg e to th o se o f
the unperturbed M arkov chain. For X N; "the expected net increase in the
3A Markov chain is irreducible if there is a positive probability of moving from any
state to any other state of the state space in a ¯nite number of periods. Let N z be the
set of all integers s ¸ 1 such that there is a positive probability of moving from the state
z to z in exactly s periods. A Markov chain is aperiodic if, for every state z,t h eg r e a t e s t
common divisor of N z is unity.
16popul ati on ofworkers,f rom onetransi ti on ti m eto thenext,condi ti onalupon
the current state x becom es
F
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Thef a c tt ha tX N; " i s i rreduci bl e and aperi odi c i m pl i es the exi stence ofa
uni que i nvari ant probabi l i ty m easure º N; "such that for any B orel set B µ
[0 ;1] ,N 2 N,and " 2 (0;1);
º









whe r eV N; "(B; T) denotes the relative frequency w ith w hich B is v isited b y
X N; " during the ¯rst T p erio d s. B y co m p u tin g th e lim it o f º N; "(B )a s"
t e n d st oz e r oa n dN tendsto i n¯ni ty,weareabl eto cal cul atethestatesthat
a re m o st lik ely to b e o b serv ed in th e lo n g ru n fo r la rg e p o p u la tio n size a n d
sm a ll ra n d o m iza tio n p ro b a b ility. M o re p recisely, w e lo o k fo r sta tes w ith th e
f ol l owi ng property. 4





N; "(U )= 1:
W e can now show the follow ing.
P roposi ti on 3 The foll owing hol ds for the perturbed M arkov C hain X N; " .
1. Ifm =1 ,t he n x =1 ¡ k 1=(n ¡1) is selected .
2. Ifm = n ,t he n x =1 is selected for k< 1=2n ¡1,andx =0 is selected
fo r k> 1=2n ¡1.
4It can be shown that Proposition 3 below holds also if the order of limits is reversed
in the de¯nition of selection, i.e., if a state x is selected when, for any neighborhood U of
x ,l i m N !1 lim"! 0 º N; "(U )=1 .
173. (a) If1 <n<mand k ¸ k ma x,t hen x =0 is selected .
(b) If 1 <n<mand k< k ma x,t he n x = x H is selected if x H > 2x L ,
and x =0 if x H < 2x L .
C onsider, in particular, the case w hen there are tw o interior restpoints.
Thebasin of attraction ofthe restpoi ntx H u n d er th e d eterm in istic rep lica to r
dynam i cs,i . e. ,the setofstarti ng- poi ntssuch thatthe traj ectory eventual l y
converges to x H , is the interval (x L ;1). Let (x L ;xH )a nd( x H ;1) be the le ft
and right sub-basins ofx H ,respectively.
W e see that l ong-run sel ecti on ofthe hi gh-e®ort equi l i bri um happens i f
the l ength ofthe l ef t sub- basi n ofx H i s greater than the l ength of(0;xL ),
the basin of attraction of x L . H ence it could happen that x H has a l arger
basin of attraction than x L but is nevertheless not selected in the long run.
In the specialcase of the sim ple-m ajority technologies de¯ned earlier,w e









M ore generally, w e can prove som e lim ited com parative statics results
relating the cost k to l ong- run equi l i bri um sel ecti on.
P roposi ti on 4 If 1 <m<n , x H =xL is strictly decreasing in k fo r k 2
(0;kma x). M oreover, there exists a k ? 2 (0;kma x) such that for k 2 (0;k?),
x H =xL > 2,f ork = k ?, x H =xL =2 ,and f ork 2 (k ?;kma x);xH =xL < 2.
P roposi ti on 5 Let ^ m; ^ n ,ands be positive integers. Ifk 2 (0;kma x);m ¡ 1=
(^ m ¡ 1)s, n ¡ 1= ( ^ n ¡ 1)s,and1 < ^ m<^ n ,then there exists an ^ s such that
for 1 · s · ^ s;xH =xL is d ecrea sin g in s;and for s> ^ s,there are no i nteri or
stationary states.
Consi der the e®ects ofscal i ng the gam e up or down by m ul ti pl yi ng the
¯rm 's size and the threshold num ber of w orkers by som e constant. P ropo-






x ! x H
x ! 0
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F igure 6: E xam ple selection boundary in cost-scale space.
eq u ilib riu m x H is m o re lik ely fo r low co st a n d low sca le, a n d th e eq u ilib riu m
w ith no w orkers for high cost and high scale.
Fi gure 6 show s an exam pl e w i th m ¡ 1= s, n ¡ 1= 2 s, x L =1 =3,and
x H =2 =3. E ach point on the curve corresponds to a com bination of k and
s such that x H =xL = 2 . T h e eq u ilib riu m x H i ssel ected f orcom bi nati onsto
the southw est of the graph, and x = 0 f orcom bi nati onsto the northeastof
the graph.
To sum up,we have shown that f or a cost ofcontri buti ng l ow enough,
a n d a ¯ rm size sm a ll en o u g h , a n eq u ilib riu m w ith a su b sta n tia l freq u en cy o f
contributors is the situation m ost likely to be observed in the long run. In
the case ofsim ple-m ajority technologies,the condition can be m ade precise.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
W e know from experi m ental work that i ndi vi dual s contri bute i n di l em m a
gam eseven when contri buti ng i snotenf orceabl e.W ehaveshown i n thi spa-
p er h ow su ch b eh av io r m ay b e u n d ersto o d a s th e lo n g -ru n sta b le eq u ilib riu m
19of an evolutionary system sub ject to m utations.
W e have thought ofthe underl yi ng publ i c goods gam e as one i n whi ch
individuals expend irretrievable e®ort. T he m odel can easily be extended
to a setti ng where contri buti ons are i nstead m onetary and f ul l y ref unded
i fthe publ i c good i s not provi ded,a case that Pal f rey and Rosenthal[ 13]
also study from a static point of view . In the evolutionary version, one can
then show that there is a unique interior restpoint w ith a larger share of
contributors than in the interior restpoints w ithout refund. M oreover, this
interior restpoint is the unique stable state of the replicator dynam ic and
thus also the unique long-run prediction of the stochastic m odel.
A di ®erent extensi on ofthe m odelwoul d be to al l ow for worker and ¯rm
heterogeneity. W orkers could di®er in term s oftheir ¯tness cost ofcontribut-
ing and ¯rm s in term s of their size and contribution threshold levels. It is
also possible to m ake the size and contribution thresholds of ¯rm s deter-
m i ned endogenousl y through evol uti on. W e l eave these questi ons for future
research.
A ppendi x
P roofofP rop osition 1. Tha tx =0 a n d x = 1 arerestpoi ntsi si m m edi ate.






m ¡1(1 ¡ x)
n ¡m = k: (1)
Forthe caseswhere m =1 a n dm = n ,(1) m ay be sol ved expl i ci tl y for the
interior restpoints. W hen w e have 1 <m<n ,the l ef thand si de of(1)i sa
si ngl e- peaked f uncti on ofx wi t hama xi mum a tx =( m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1). H ence







¶m ¡1 µn ¡ m
n ¡ 1
¶n ¡m
= k ma x;
20the equati on (1) has at l east one sol uti on. In case the rel ati on hol ds w i th
eq u a lity, th e u n iq u e so lu tio n is x =( m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1). O therw ise (1) has
exactly tw o roots,w here one is necessarily strictly less than (m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1),
the other strictly greater. 2
Pr oofofPr opos i t i on 2.Weh a v et h a t
'






m ¡1(1 ¡ x)
n ¡m ((n +1 ) x ¡ m ):
Suppose we have m =1 . T h e nw e h a v e ' 0 (0) = 1 ¡ k> 0,' 0 (1) = k> 0,
and ' 0 (1 ¡ k 1=(n ¡1))= ( n ¡ 1)(k n=(n ¡1)¡ k) < 0.
Suppose instead w e have m = n .The nweha v e' 0 (0) = ¡ k< 0,' 0 (1) =
k ¡ 1 < 0,and ' 0 (k 1=(n ¡1))= ( n ¡ 1)(k ¡ k n=(n ¡1)) > 0.
Fi nal l y,suppose we have 1 <m<n .The nweha v e' 0 (0) = ¡ k< 0a n d







? (1 ¡ x ?)
n ¡m = k:
Substituting, w e ¯nd that
'




N ote that if w e have x ? =( m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1),then x ? i s a saddl e poi nt that
attracts in one direction and repels in the other,and is therefore categorized
as unstabl e. 2
T he idea behind the proof of P roposition 3 is to calculate the lim it of the
uni quei nvari antprobabi l i ty m easure º N; "as N tendsto i n¯ni ty and " tends
to 0. W hen the determ inistic dynam ic has a uni que stationary state,w e rely
upon the f ol l owi ng l em m a,whi ch hol dsf orany " 2 [0 ;1); to determ ine this
lim it.
21Lem m a 1 For any open set U ½ [0 ;1]contai ning allthe stationary states









Pr oo f .T h is fo llow s d irectly fro m P ro p o sitio n 4 o f B en aÄ³m a n d W eib u ll [4 ]
by observing that the determ inistic dynam ic has no periodic orbits. 2
W hen there is m ore than one stationary state,w e proceed by estim ating
a n d co m p a rin g th e m in im u m p ro b a b ility o f rea ch in g a n d th e m a x im u m p ro b -
a b ility o f leav in g th e b a sin s o f a ttraction ofevery asym ptotically stable state.









denote its basin of attraction. B y P roposition 8 in B enaÄ ³m








,t hecost of the transition from fx 0g to





"(y;y +1 =N ) ¡ lo g P
"(y;y ¡ 1=N ))dy:
Usi ng thi sconceptwecan de¯netheradius ofx 0;R (fx 0g);as the low est cost
ofgoi ng from fx 0g to any state outside its basin of attraction, i.e., as















Li kewi s e,t heco-radius ofx 0 c a nb ed e ¯ n e da st h eh i g h e s tc o s tt og ot ot h e
basin of attraction of x 0 from anyw here outside its basin of attraction, i.e.,
as



















Lem m a 2 Letx be an asym ptoticall y stabl e state of the determ ini stic dy-
nam i c and suppose U ½ [1 ;0] i s an open nei ghborhood of x.I f R( fxg) >











N; "(T ) 2 U
´
=1 :
22Pr oo f .T h is fo llow s im m ed ia tely fro m P ro p o sitio n 6 in B en aÄ³m a n d W eib u ll [4 ].
2
The f ol l owi ng l em m ata are usef ulf or the cal cul ati on ofthe radi us and
co-radius.
Lem m a 3 Let x "
0 and x "
P be tw o arbitrary states such that x "
0 ! x 0 and
x "












lo g P "(y;y +1 =N ) ¡ lo g P "(y;y ¡ 1=N )
lo g "
dy:
Pr oo f .A ssum e w ithout loss of generality that x "
0 · x "




and de¯ne the indicator function Ix "
0;x "
P that takes on the value 1 for x 2
[x "
0;x"

























lo g ((1 ¡ y)"=2)dy<
Z
I0;1 (1 ¡ lo g (1 ¡ y))dy =2 :












"! 0 Ix "
0;x "
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lo g P "(y;y +1 =N )
lo g "
dy













lo g P "(y;y ¡ 1=N )
lo g "
dy;
w hich proves the statem ent. 2
Lem m a 4 Let(x "
0) be a sequ en ce of asym ptotically stable states such that
lim "! 0 x "
0 = x 0; and l et (x "
P ) be a sequen ce of states su ch that x "
P is in th e
23cl osure ofthe basin ofattraction ofx "
0 for every " 2 (0;1) and lim "! 0 x "
P =






¡ lo g "
= x P ¡ x 0:



















log ((1 ¡ ")y (1 ¡ y)m axfg(y) ¡ k;0g +( 1 ¡ y)"=2)dy:
D e¯nethei ndi catorf uncti on IP + =0that takes on the value 1 for x such that
P (x;x +1 =N )= 0 and 0 for al lother x.Usi ng thi sf uncti on and Lem m a 3,




"! 0 IP + =0









1 ¡ IP + =0






IP + =0dy +0 =x P ¡ x 0:
S im ila rly, b y d e¯ n in g th e in d ica to r fu n ctio n IP ¡ =0that takes on the value 1


































1 ¡ IP ¡ =0





24P roof of P rop osition 3. C ase 1: m =1 . Forposi ti ve",t hef unct i on F "
W
hasa uni que rooton the uni ti nterval ;x "
M : As" tends to zero,x "
M tends to
x M =1 ¡ k 1=(n ¡1) and hence,the statem ent follow s directly by Lem m a 1.
Ca s e2 :m = n . For su± ciently sm all",thef uncti on F "
W hasthreerootson
the unit interval;x "
0;x"
P ;and x "
1;butonl y x "
0 and x "
1 are asym ptotically stable
states. A s " tendsto zero,the three pointsconverge to 0;xP = k 1=(n ¡1);and 1
respectively:Iti scl earthattheradi usofx "
0 is eq u a l to c (fx "
0g;fx "
P g) and the
co-radius c (fx "
1g;fx "
P g). Sim ilarly,the radius of x "
1 is eq u a l to c (fx "
1g;fx "
P g)
and the co-radi us c (fx "
0g;fx "
P g). B y L em m a 2, in the lim it, as " tends to










x 1 ¡ x P
x P ¡ x 0
= k
1=(1¡n ) ¡ 1:
T h is im p lies th a t if k< 21¡n , there exists an ^ ",such that for al l" 2 (0;^ "),
CR( f1g) < R( f1g)a n di fk> 21¡n , there exists an · ", such that for al l
" 2 (0;· "), C R (f0g) < R( f0g).
Ca s e3 :1 <n<mand k< k ma x. For su± ciently sm all ",t hef unc t i on
F "
W has three roots on the uni t i nterval ;x "
0;x"
L ; and x "
H : T he ¯rst and the
l ast ofthese poi nts are asym ptoti cal l y stabl e: As" tends to zero, the three
points converge to 0;xL ; and x H respectively: It is clear that the radius of
x "
0 is eq u a l to c (fx "
0g;fx "
L g) and the co-radius c (fx "
H g;fx "
L g). Sim ilarly, the
radius of x "
H is eq u a l to c (fx "
H g;fx "
L g) and the co-radius c (fx "
0g;fx "
L g). B y













T h is im p lies th a t if x H =xL > 2,there exi sts an ^ ",such thatf oral l" 2 (0;^ "),
CR( fx H g) < R( fx H g),and if x H =xL < 2,there exi stsan · ",such thatf oral l
" 2 (0;· "), C R (f0g) < R( f0g).
Ca s e4 :1 <m<nand k ¸ k ma x. If x ? =( m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1) < 1=2a n d
k = k ma x;for su± ciently sm all",thef uncti on F "
W hasthreerootson theuni t
interval; x "
0;x"
L ; and x "
H (if (m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1) = 1=2, the tw o latter coincide
25wi t h x ?): O f these, x "
0 and x "
H are asym ptotically stable states: As" tends
to zero, x "
0 converges to 0; and x "
L and x "
H both converge to x ?: Thi sc a s ei s












¡ 1= 0 ;
CR( f0g) < R( f0g) for su± ciently sm all ".
If x ? =( m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1)> 1=2a n dk = k ma x,ori fk> k ma x,f orsu± ci entl y
sm all",thef uncti on F "
W hasonerooton theuni ti nterval ;x "
0:Si ncethi spoi nt
c o n v e r g e st o0a s" tends to zero,the statem ent follow s directly by L em m a 1.
2
Pr oofofPr opos i t i on 4.F irst, w e shall prove that @ (x H =xL )=@k < 0f o r
al lk 2 (0;kma x). For x 2f x L ;xH g, g(x) ¡ k =0 a n d














¡ @ (g(x) ¡ k)=@k










T he l ast expressi on i s negati ve for x>(m ¡ 1)(n ¡ 1) and posi ti ve for
x< (m ¡ 1)(n ¡ 1). Si nce x L < (m ¡ 1)(n ¡ 1) <x H , it fo llow s th a t
@xL =@k > 0a n d@xH =@k < 0,and thus,
@ (x H =xL )
@k
=




T h is im p lies th a t x H =xL i s a conti nuous and stri ctl y decreasi ng f uncti on of
k on (0;kma x).
Secondl y,we shal lprove that there exi sts a ^ k such that x H > 2x L .L e t















26C learly,^ k 2 (0;kma x)andf oral lx 2 [(®=2)(m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1);®(m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1)] ,
weha vet hat
g(x) > ^ k:














Si nce l i m k! k ma xx H =xL =1 < 2, the continuity and strict m onotonicity
ofx H =xL on (0;kma x) im ply that there exists a k ? such that for k 2 (0;k?),
x H =xL > 2,for k = k ?;xH =xL =2 ; and for k 2 (k ?;kma x);xH =xL < 2. 2








a (1 ¡ x)
b¡a :
Suppose that,f orx 2f x L ;xH g and s ¸ 1;
g (x;s(m ¡ 1);s(n ¡ 1))= k s:
The nt he r ee xi s t sak s+1> 0s u c ht h a t , f o rx 2f x L ;xH g ;
g (x;(s +1 ) ( m ¡ 1);(s +1 ) ( n ¡ 1))= k s+1:




g (x;(s +1 ) ( m ¡ 1);(s +1 ) ( n ¡ 1))
g (x;s(m ¡ 1);s(n ¡ 1))
·
g ((m ¡ 1)= (n ¡ 1);(s +1 ) ( m ¡ 1);(s +1 ) ( n ¡ 1))
g ((m ¡ 1)= (n ¡ 1);s(m ¡ 1);s(n ¡ 1))
< 1;
w h ere th e la st in eq u a lity fo llow s fro m a sta n d a rd p ro p erty o f th e b in o m ia l
distribution. Since, by P roposition 4, @ (x H =xL )=@k < 0 , th is im p lies th a t
x H =xL is strictly decreasing in s for s such that
g ((m ¡ 1)= (n ¡ 1);(s +1 ) ( m ¡ 1);(s +1 ) ( n ¡ 1))¸ k:
27F in a lly, sin ce
lim
s!1g (x;s(m ¡ 1);s(n ¡ 1))= 0
for an y x 2 [0 ;1 ] ,i tf o l l o wst ha tt he r ee xi s t sa n ^ s> 1s u c ht h a tf o rs> ^ s,
g ((m ¡ 1)= (n ¡ 1);s(m ¡ 1);s(n ¡ 1))<k :
H ence,for such s there are no interior stationary states. 2
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